




























We examine the influence of corporate compensation policies on firms’ tax aggressiveness 
in an emerging market where executive compensation is primarily in cash form. Based on a hand-
collected dataset of 958 firm-year observations of Chinese listed firms for the 2006-2012 period, 
we find that firms paying higher executive cash compensation are associated with lower tax 
aggressiveness. This relationship also holds for the excess cash compensation measures which 
control for executive shareholding, firm profitability, size, growth opportunity, and board 
independence. We further document that mutual funds ownership pressure firms paying higher 
compensation to reduce their tax aggressiveness, suggesting adverse selection by mutual funds on 
firms exhibiting risky tax avoidance activities. High leverage offsets the negative link between 
cash compensation and tax aggressiveness, indicating a complementary effect between debt and 
tax avoidance, and, hence, suggesting that creditor monitoring is weak. These results are robust to 
the system-GMM estimation, which simultaneously account for the endogeneity of executive 
compensation, tax aggressiveness, ownership and control, leverage, and corporate governance. 
Our findings on Chinese firms have important policy implications for developing countries around 
the world with concentrated ownership structure, weak institutional environment, widespread 
corruption, ineffective rule of law, and ongoing significant social and political transformation. 
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We have an incomplete understanding of firms’ tax avoidance activities which, in its more 
extreme form, is often referred to as tax aggressiveness. Prior studies reveal that firm level 
attributes determine corporate tax aggressiveness. These include profitability, foreign operations, 
asset tangibility, research and development, leverage, and financial reporting aggressiveness (see 
Shevlin, 2007; Rego and Wilson, 2012; and Richardson et al., 2013, 2014 for reviews). It is 
generally expected that shareholders prefer reduced tax liabilities and, hence, firms exhibit tax 
aggressiveness. Tax aggressiveness, however, engenders significant risk for firms especially in 
absence of effective corporate governance mechanisms that can mitigate managerial rent-seeking 
masked by tax avoidance activities (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006, 2009; Hanlon and Slemrod, 
2009; Kim et al., 2011; Armstrong et al., 2015). An important strand of this literature has looked 
at the influence of executive compensation, as an important governance mechanism, on firm tax 
avoidance and suggests that the level of equity-based compensation is positively associated with 
the extent of corporate tax avoidance (Phillips, 2003; Minnick and Noga, 2010; Armstrong et al., 
2012, 2015; Rego and Wilson, 2012). This is because risky tax avoidance activities increase stock 
return volatility and the value of stock option portfolios that are associated with the equity-based 
executive compensation. Also, Rego and Wilson (2012) argue that managers must be incentivized 
to engage in tax avoidance activities that are expected to generate net risk-adjusted benefits for the 
shareholders.  
In contrast to the incentives embedded in executive options and share ownership, which, 
according to agency theory, can improve the alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ interests 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Chien et al., 2016), non-equity based 
compensation, mainly including salary and bonus, has attracted much less attention regarding its 
influence on tax aggressiveness. Armstrong et al. (2012), for example, examine the association 
between total executive compensation and firm tax avoidance and find the association statistically 
insignificant when total CEO/CFO compensation is used to measure executive compensation. It is 
uncertain whether this finding can be generalized to international markets especially where 
compensation practices are very different from the US. Further, prior evidence suggests that cash 
compensation is more sensitive to negative returns as it is to positive returns (e.g., Lambert and 
Larcker, 1987; Leone et al., 2006). Under the premise that stock market reacts negatively to the 
news on firms’ tax aggressiveness activities (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009; Kim et al., 2011), the 
3 
 
association between cash compensation and tax aggressiveness is of critical importance especially 
in an institutional environment where executive compensation is primarily in cash form. In the 
absence of executive stock option incentives, firms would engage in tax avoidance when the 
benefit of tax liabilities reduction outweighs the incremental costs, such as legal and accounting 
fees, as well as reputation penalties. Nonetheless, risk-averse managers are more likely to 
undertake less risky tax planning.  
This paper aims to fill this research gap by investigating the influence of executive 
compensation on tax aggressiveness of Chinese listed firms. According to Cai and Liu (2009), tax 
avoidance activities in China are widespread due to the weak enforcement of tax laws. In particular, 
a lack of manpower to deal with the tax-related issues for increasing number of listed firms, 
insufficient training and skills, and ineffective management of the tax collection agency, etc. The 
Chinese market is particularly suitable for extending this strand of literature as executive 
compensations among its listed companies are mostly cash based (Firth et al., 2006, 2007; Chen 
et al., 2011; Conyon and He, 2011).1 Listed firms in China maintain a two-tier board system 
consisting of a board of directors and a board of supervisors. Ding et al. (2010) provide a 
comprehensive review from a legal perspective on China’s corporate governance system. This 
study finds that after the new Corporate Law became effective in 2006, total executive 
compensation is associated with both the size and the meeting frequency of the supervisory board. 
As most listed companies are “carve-outs” from the former State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), often 
politicians are appointed as the executives and directors (Sun and Tong, 2003; Firth et al., 2006). 
Moreover, unlike the corporate governance research on US firms which focuses on the principal-
agent conflict between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990), more recent research, conducted in emerging markets such as China, suggests 
“tunneling” as the primary type of agency cost arising from the principal-principal conflict 
between the controlling shareholders and the minority investors (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens 
et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Lins, 2003; Jiang et al., 2010; Liu and Tian, 2012; Qian and 
Yueng, 2015; Huang, 2016; Guo, 2016). Given the concentrated ownership structure, the 
                                                          
1 Conyon and He (2011) and Chen et al. (2011) review the compensation disclosure requirement by The Chinese 
Securities Regulation Committee (CSRC). Under the Chinese context, CSRC defines “top management” as all 
executives, directors, and supervisors. Total compensation paid to executives and board members includes salary, 
bonus, stipends, and other benefits. 
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controlling shareholders have dominant influence over the corporate policies and the principal-
agent conflict is relatively less severe than the principal-principal conflict. Consequently, equity-
based incentive compensation is not as widely adopted by Chinese firms as by the US firms. 
Studying tax aggressiveness under the Chinese setting, hence, sheds further light on the links 
among corporate governance, corporate compensation practices, and tax aggressiveness.  
This paper also offers timely insights into the association between executive compensation 
and corporate tax avoidance activities against the backdrop of the convergence of Chinese GAAP 
with IFRS over the past two decades (Peng and Smith, 2010; Cang et al., 2014; and Hou et al., 
2014) and the more recent anti-corruption campaign initiated by the Chinese government (see Pan 
and Tian, 2017 for a review). Since 2012, the Chinese GAAP has imposed more stringent 
requirements over internal control disclosure and audit procedures, similar to the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (SOX), particularly, with regard to the mandatory disclosure of internal control 
weaknesses (ICWs).  Prior to this regulatory change, ICWs were disclosed voluntarily in the audit 
reports in China (See Chen et al., 2016 and Ji et al., 2017 for reviews). Chan and Chow (1997) 
further point out that tax audits in China differ among listed firms, with the difference depending 
on firms’ profitability level and ownership structure. Similar as in the US, significantly more focus 
has been put on the tax risk in China due to the high rate of tax-related internal control deficiencies, 
as well as the strengthened public enforcement against financial fraud by CSRC (Hung et al., 2015).   
In a similar vein, Cohen et al. (2009) indicate that the association between equity risk 
incentives and managerial risk taking has weakened in the US since the SOX. There is, therefore, 
a general trend towards more corporate transparency and stronger public governance, which calls 
for more policy research. For instance, Hou et al. (2014) find strong evidence supporting the 
positive role of mandatory IFRS adoption on the relationship between accounting-based 
performance and executive compensation in China. Houqe and Monem (2016) analyze a sample 
of 104 countries over the period 2009-2011 and suggest that the length of IFRS experience and the 
extent of accounting disclosure are negatively related to the perceived level of corruption in a 
country. More importantly, developing countries benefit more from IFRS experience in lowering 
their perceived levels of corruption. Hence, our findings on Chinese firms have important policy 
implications for developing countries around the world with concentrated ownership structure, 
weak institutional environment, widespread corruption, ineffective legal system, and ongoing 
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significant social and political transformation (Lins, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; La Porta et 
al., 1999). 
In summary, we contribute to the extant literature in two ways. First, we provide an 
important extension of the literature on corporate compensation practices and tax avoidance 
activities by focusing on cash compensation. Second, we explore two possible channels through 
which the external monitoring agents, i.e., mutual funds and creditors, under the Chinese 
institutional environment, may influence the relationship between cash compensation and tax 
aggressiveness. We find that firms paying higher executive cash compensation, or higher excess 
cash compensation, exhibit lower tax aggressiveness. Mutual funds ownership strengthens the 
negative link between excess cash compensation and tax aggressiveness. These findings indicate 
that when internal governance is weak, firms paying excess compensation reduce the extent of 
their aggressive tax avoidance activities to avoid the adverse selection problem. We also find that 
the level of financial leverage is positively associated with the degree of tax aggressiveness, 
indicating a complementary relationship between the two and the weak external monitoring role 
played by the debt-holders in China.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the research 
background and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample and methods. Section 4 
discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Research background and hypotheses development 
2.1 Tax aggressiveness and firm value 
Extant research on corporate tax aggressiveness offers two competing views on its 
economic consequences. A traditional view considers tax aggressiveness as value enhancing as it 
reduces corporate tax burden at the cost of state tax revenues. The associated risk is being detected 
by external auditors and tax authorities. Studies such as Graham and Tucker (2006) find that 
investors hold this value-enhancing view. Consequently, several studies have explored the factors 
that may enhance a firm’s tax avoidance ability. Phillip (2003) documents that compensating 
managers on the basis of after-tax performance measures lowers a firm’s effective tax rates. Rego 
and Wilson (2012) argue that tax aggressiveness involves significant uncertainty, and the 
managerial incentives embedded in the stock options motivate managers to undertake risky tax 
avoidance activities. Similarly, Minnick and Noga (2010) find that tax avoidance benefits 
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shareholders in the long-run and that incentive-based compensation drives managers to invest in 
tax management. Armstrong et al. (2012) show that the incentive compensation of the tax director 
is negatively related to the reported tax expenses. Although these prior studies acknowledge the 
direct costs of tax aggressiveness (i.e., fees paid to the accountants and attorneys, the managerial 
time devoted to planning for and resolving audits with tax authorities), the other significant indirect 
costs associated with tax aggressiveness are often overlooked. As Chen and Chu (2005) and 
Crocker and Slemrod (2005) have pointed out in their studies, this traditional view ignores the 
associated agency costs of tax avoidance.  
A competing view of tax avoidance adopts the agency theory framework (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Murphy, 1990) and suggests that in a weak corporate governance 
environment, tax aggressiveness can be detrimental to shareholder value due to managerial 
resource diversions (Chen and Chu, 2005; Crocker and Slemrod, 2005; Desai and Dharmapala, 
2006, 2009). Tax aggressiveness engenders significant risk for both firms and managers and 
reduces shareholder value in absence of effective governance mechanisms (Desai and Dharmapala, 
2006, 2009; Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009; Kim et al., 2011; Rego and Wilson, 2012; Armstrong et 
al., 2015). Desai and Dharmapala (2006; 2009) provide empirical evidence of the managerial 
resource diversion facilitated by tax avoidance and their findings further suggest that tax 
aggressiveness can incentivize managers to hide bad news and mislead investors. This strand of 
literature has also examined the stock market consequences of tax aggressiveness from the agency 
perspective. Minnick and Noga (2010) suggest that tax aggressiveness is detrimental to 
shareholder value especially in the short-run, and they nonetheless also document the long-run 
value gains from tax planning. Hasan et al. (2014) further indicate that firms engaging in risky tax 
avoidance are subject to investor adverse selection. Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) document a 
negative market reaction to the news about firms’ tax sheltering activities. This negative reaction 
is less pronounced for firms with stronger governance. Kim et al. (2011) find tax avoidance 
activities facilitate both managerial rent seeking and bad news hoarding by providing tools, masks, 
and justifications for these behaviours. Accumulation of such bad news leads to the risk of future 
stock price crash, and strong external monitoring mechanisms, such as institutional ownership, 
analyst coverage, and takeover threat, can attenuate this type of risk.  
2.2 Hypotheses development 
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Tax represent a significant cost to a firm and its shareholders, and, hence, it is generally 
expected that shareholders prefer tax aggressiveness. However, this argument ignores the potential 
non-tax costs that can accompany tax aggressiveness, especially those arising from agency 
problems (Chen et al., 2010). Studies such as Desai and Dharmapala (2006, 2009), Hanlon and 
Slemrod (2009), Kim et al. (2011) and Armstrong et al. (2015) have provided extensive evidence 
that tax aggressiveness engenders significant risk for both firms and managers with the absence of 
effective corporate governance mechanisms. Further, this body of literature has documented a 
positive association between equity-based incentive compensation and tax aggressiveness, 
provided that  risky tax avoidance activities increases stock volatility which in turn increases the 
values of executive stock options (Minnick and Noga, 2010; Armstrong et al., 2012, 2015; and 
Rego and Wilson, 2012). With regard to the non-equity compensation, Healy (1985) suggests that 
cash compensation encourages managers to focus on short-term objectives, and, Minnick and 
Noga (2010) argue that tax aggressiveness is detrimental to shareholder value in the short-run but 
benefits shareholders in the long-run, and that incentive compensation encourages tax management. 
Compared to equity-incentives, cash salaries and bonus contracts are usually linked with 
accounting earnings and not explicitly with stock returns (Duru et al., 2005, 2012). This short-run 
interest alignment motivates managers whose compensation are in cash form to reduce tax 
avoidance activities. 
In addition, managers receiving higher compensation may be subject to stricter scrutiny, 
and, hence, may be pressured to reduce tax avoidance activities and to improve corporate 
transparency in order to avoid the adverse selection problems associated with both shareholders 
and creditors (Hasan et al., 2014; Chung et al., 2015). With respect of the creditors, Kabir et al. 
(2013) find that corporate bondholders are fully aware of both risk-taking and risk-avoiding 
incentives created by the various executive pay components. With regard to the shareholders, 
Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) document the existence of reputation penalties when aggressive tax 
avoidance becomes public knowledge and suggest that these penalties negatively affect investors’ 
assessments of the firm value. As a result, adverse selection increases both the cost of debt and the 
cost of equity, leading to stock price discounts. Chen et al. (2010) document that family-owned 
firms in the US are less tax aggressive than their counterparts which suggests that these family 
firms are willing to forgo tax benefits to avoid a potential price discount, a typical non-tax-related 
cost that can arise when minority shareholders become concerned with the family rent-seeking 
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masked by tax avoidance activities. Therefore, we expect that, when executive compensation is in 
cash form, i.e., in absence of the stock option incentives, Chinese firms would engage in less tax 
avoidance activities, because all the combined costs incurred, for example, the costs of 
legal/accounting fees and the discounts of share values associated with adverse selection problems, 
outweigh the reduction in tax liabilities. Nonetheless, risk-averse managers are less likely to 
undertake risky tax avoidance activities. The above argument leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Executive cash compensation is negatively related to tax aggressiveness. 
 
To shed more light on the adverse selection costs associated with the investors, we conduct 
further analysis on the influence of marginal investors on the link between executive cash 
compensation and tax aggressiveness. As minority ownership is often too diffused to influence 
firm decisions, we focus on the impact of mutual funds that are often considered as one of the most 
important group of investors under the institutional environment of Chinese market. For instance, 
Moore (2012) shows that institutional ownership reduces book-tax differences among US firms. 
Mutual funds can administer their right either directly by the voice of proxy vote, i.e. activism, or 
indirectly through “voting with their feet” (Chung and Zhang, 2011; Helwege at al., 2012). Since 
2000, Chinese regulators have undertaken substantial efforts to develop financial institutions with 
the primary intention to improve the efficiency of the listed firms and help stabilize the stock 
market (Firth et al., 2016). Studies such as Yuan et al. (2008, 2009) and Firth et al. (2016) have 
provided empirical evidence of the monitoring role of mutual funds but also suggest that Chinese 
mutual funds tend to focus more on short-term profits such as dividends. Similarly, Chan et al. 
(2014) show that mutual fund ownership enhances financial reporting quality of Chinese firms. 
According to Hartzell and Starks (2003), institutional investors may enhance shareholder value 
through their influence over the executive compensation. Following the same line of logic above, 
we further conjecture that adverse selection of mutual funds exerts pressure over firms paying high 
compensation to reduce tax aggressiveness. And, hence, we hypothesize that: 
 
H2: The interaction between executive cash compensation and mutual fund shareholding 




Finally, we shift our attention to the influence of debt on the link between executive cash 
compensation and tax aggressiveness. Kabir et al. (2013) and Hasan et al. (2014) document that 
tax-aggressive firms are subject to adverse selection, where, the managers may reduce tax 
aggressiveness under the monitoring pressure from the creditors. In addition, Lim (2011, 2012), 
Lin et al. (2014), and Richardson et al. (2014) find a negative relationship between tax 
aggressiveness and the level of debt suggesting a substitution effect of tax aggressiveness for debt 
financing. Graham and Tucker (2006) gather a sample of 44 tax shelter cases in the US and find 
that these firms use less debt when they engage in tax sheltering. Minhat and Dzolkarnaini (2016) 
document similar empirical evidence in the UK on the substitutability of executive compensation 
and firm’s debt/lease financing using a sample of large British firms. This further indicates a 
possible link between compensation and tax aggressiveness due to the substitutional effect of tax 
avoidance on debt (Lim, 2011, 2012; Lin et al., 2014; Richardson et al., 2014). As pointed out by 
Lin et al. (2014), however, for the most profitable firms, debt and tax aggressiveness are 
complementary to each other. This complementary effect is also grounded in Duru et al. (2005, 
2012) indicating that earnings-based cash bonus is negatively related to both the use of debt and 
the cost of debt.  
Given the above and, particularly, that we have hypothesized a negative association 
between cash compensation and tax aggressiveness, we expect a positive statistical relation 
between the level of debt and tax aggressiveness. The economic intuition behind is related to the 
Chinese institutional environment. The argument regarding creditor adverse selection and the 
reduced tax aggressiveness relies on the effectiveness of the monitoring role of the debt-holders. 
According to the extant literature, bank monitoring on their clients listed on the stock market is 
generally very limited in China (Liu and Tian, 2012; Qian and Yeung, 2015). Despite the fact that 
bank loans are the main source of debt financing for listed firms in China,  the banking system is 
dominated by low efficiency banks whose credit allocation decisions are under strong influence of 
the government policies (Berger et al., 2009; García-Herrero et al. ,2009). Qian and Yeung (2015) 
suggest that easier access to bank loans by state-associated Chinese listed firms leads to the 
tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders. Moreover, Liu and Tian (2012) find that excess 
leverage is used for tunneling, instead of capital investment, among Chinese listed private firms. 
These studies demonstrate that bank inefficiency can reduce the disciplinary power of equity 
capital market. In light of the extensive literature on the expropriation of minority shareholders by 
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the controlling shareholder in China (Jiang et al., 2010; Qian and Yueng, 2015), we hypothesize 
that: 
 
H3: The interaction between executive cash compensation and financial leverage is positively 
associated with tax aggressiveness. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Tax aggressiveness measure 
Extensive literature has used book-tax differences (BTDs), broadly defined as the 
differences between the income figures announced to the capital market and that reported to the 
tax authorities, as an indicator of firm tax aggressiveness/avoidance (e.g. Desai and Dharmapala, 
2006, 2009; Frank et al. 2009; Wilson, 2009; Chan et al. 2010; Kim et al., 2011; Tang and Firth, 
2011, 2012; Armstrong et al. 2012; Wahad and Holland, 2015; Tang, 2015). In particular, Wilson 
(2009) and Graham and Tucker (2006) on the US firms, and Tang and Firth (2011, 2012) on the 
Chinese firms show that firms using greater extent of tax shelters are more profitable and have 
larger BTDs. There are generally two different measures of BTDs, with one capturing the income 
effect and the other, the tax effect. The common method adopted in the US-based studies is to 
estimate the income-effect BTD either by taking the difference between book income and taxable 
income that is estimated by grossing-up current tax expenses, or by using the effective tax rate 
reconciliation to infer total BTDs (see Tang and Firth, 2011 for a review). Tang and Firth (2011, 
2012) propose the measure of tax-effect BTDs by utilizing a manually collected dataset of 525 
firm-year observations over 1999-2004 period with detailed tax reconciliation information 
provided in the notes to the published financial statements. According to Tang and Firth 
(2011,2012), the tax-effect BTD measure is particularly appropriate for the Chinese context 
because it provides a more precise measure than the income-effect BTD where firms are subject 
to varying tax rates due to differential government tax incentives and where separate tax reporting 
is required. 2  Similarly, Wahab and Holland (2015) use tax reconciliations for 798 firm-year 
observations of UK firms to obtain total BTD values. Richardson et al. (2013) use tax avoidance 
                                                          
2 See Tang and Firth (2011) for an example of how to compute tax-effect BTDs and income-effect BTDs and the 
different results of those computations. 
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activities reported in the annual reports of 203 Australian firms as a direct measure of tax 
aggressiveness.  
Tang and Firth (2011, 2012) focus on merely the B-share firms in China because the 
information on tax reconciliations of A-share firms were not disclosed for their sample period. 
And, hence, A-share firms, which account for more than 95% of Chinese listed companies, are left 
unexplored. More recently, the 2006 version of Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises 
(ASBE)3 , in particular, ASBE18 Income Taxes, provides guidelines for the voluntary disclosure 
of reconciliation between the actual tax expenses in the income statement and the notional tax 
expenses calculated as the product of the pre-tax accounting profit and the applicable tax rate. This 
reconciliation effectively provides a breakdown of the major sources of a firm's BTDs. Under 
ASBE 18 Income Taxes, BTDs arise principally as a result of the following common categories: 
(1) income not taxable; (2) non-deductible expenses for tax purposes; (3) the effects arising from 
differences in effective tax rate of subsidiaries, particularly those operating in foreign jurisdictions; 
(4) and prior year’s adjustments to tax payable. We manually collected the reported value under 
all these categories from the notes to the financial statements in the annual reports for all A-share 
firms, and specifically, from the relevant tax reconciliation information for the financial years 
2006-2012. Appendix A shows an example of the tax reconciliation information extracted from a 
company’s annual report. 
 (Insert Table 1 here) 
Table 1 lists the BTD categories along with their corresponding drivers/accounts of the 
mechanical differences according to the Chinese GAAP and tax law. For each driver, we have 
identified the proxy accounting variables for further empirical analysis.4 The sum of all the BTD 
categories is considered as total BTD. Due to changes of the tax regulation over the sample period, 
all total BTD values are rescaled by dividing their respective statutory corporate tax rate for each 
                                                          
3 Available in Chinese at http://www.casc.gov.cn/kjfg/200607/t20060703_337130.htm. 
4 For example, income not taxable is listed as a category of BTD. According to Article 26 of The Enterprise Income 
Tax Law, equity investment income such as dividend income and bonuses are not taxed. Therefore it is considered as 
a driver for this BTD category. Chinese listed firms do not disclose dividend income separately, but it is conflated 
with investment income. Hence, investment income is used as a proxy for the non-taxable income. 
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firm-year observation for consistent comparisons.5 BTDs may arise from three sources: earning 
management, tax avoidance and mechanical differences due to the divergence between GAAP and 
tax laws, (Tang and Firth, 2011, 2012; and Tang, 2015). The literature to date has made various 
attempts to adjust BTDs, in order to better capture the empirical contents of tax avoidance. For 
instance, studies such as Desai and Dharmapala (2006, 2009), Frank et al. (2009), and Wilson 
(2009) on US firms, and Tang and Firth (2011, 2012) on Chinese firms have attempted to use a 
residual approach via decomposing BTDs into 'normal' BTDs and 'abnormal' BTDs.6 Following 
these prior studies, we measure tax aggressiveness, denoted as TAXAGG, by eliminating the 
mechanical differences from the total BTD to derive the “abnormal BTD” component,. TAXAGG 
is estimated from the fixed-effects regression model below: 
BTDit = 𝛼𝑖 + β1INVINCit + β2INTINCit + 𝛽3OPEXPit + β4𝐹𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑡 + β5LOG(ASSETSit)
+ 𝛽6OPBITit + 𝛽7PBTit + 𝛽8PBTit−1 + 𝛽9PBTit−2 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
--- Equation (1) 
In Equation (1), the dependent variable is total BTD, and the independent variables are the 
proxies for BTD drivers listed in Table 1 including current period investment income  INVINCit, 
interest income INTINCit, operating expenses OPEXPit, the percentage of overseas sales 𝐹𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑡, 
the log of total assets LOG(ASSETS)it, operating profit before interest and tax OPBITit, net profit 
before tax PBTit, and the net profit before tax in previous periods PBTit−1 and PBTit−2. As also 
indicated in Table 1, we use fixed firm effects 𝛼𝑖 and year effects 𝜏𝑡 to control for unobservable 
influences on BTDs including industrial membership, geographical tax policy differences, and 
time variations in tax regulations and enforcement. We scale all continuous variables in the model 
except LOG(ASSETS)it and 𝐹𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑡 by prior year-end total assets and winsorize them at 1% and 
99% to run the regression. We then use the regression error 𝜀𝑖𝑡 as our tax aggressiveness measure 
denoted as 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑡, calculated as the actual total BTD value minus the fitted BTD value from 
the Equation (1) regression. 
                                                          
5 The Enterprise Income Tax Law, enacted in March 2007 and in force since January 2008 homogenized (gradually) 
the corporate income tax rate for both foreign-investment enterprises and domestic enterprises to 25%, while prior to 
this EIT Law, foreign-invested enterprises had benefitted from a lower tax rate of 15% and domestic enterprises had 
paid 33%. Unreported results suggest that using unadjusted total BTDs in our analysis does not affect our key findings. 
6 Similarly, Tang (2015) regress total BTD on discretionary accruals and the difference between the statutory tax rate 
and the effective tax rate, and their interaction term to measure the mandatory book-tax conformity.  
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As robustness checks, we have also used an alternative measure to estimate BTD so as to 
derive the tax aggressiveness measure. Tang and Firth (2011, 2012) and Tang (2015) illustrate that 
abnormal book-tax differences (ABTD) reflect the opportunistic differences due to aggressive tax 
management and book income reporting, and this is particularly well suited for measuring tax 
aggressiveness for Chinese firms. ABTD would rise with the occurrence of income and tax 
manipulation activities. A positive ABTD is considered as a result of current earnings and/or tax-
related cash flows being overstated. In contrast, firms are presumed to have manipulated their 
taxable income upward (smoothing taxes) or/and to have managed their earnings downward 
(smoothing earnings), leading to a negative ABTD (lower ABTD). Correspondingly, a negative 
ABTD is a result of understated current earnings and/or tax-related cash flows. Our BTD drivers 
and proxies adhere closely to the ABSE (2006). We the BTD model in Tang and Firth (2011, 2012) 
as follows to derive the alternative tax aggressiveness measure: 
𝐵𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐿𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖
+ 𝛿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
--- Equation (2) 
In Equation (2), the drivers of mechanical differences in BTDs are change in fixed assets 
investment ∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡, change in revenues ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡, the value of operating losses 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡, the value of 
tax loss utilized 𝑇𝐿𝑈𝑖𝑡, the difference between the consolidated company's applicable tax rate and 
the average tax rate in the consolidated group account 𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡. We further control for industry 
and year fixed effects by including industry dummies 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖  and year dummies 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 . All 
continuous variables expect 𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡  are scaled by prior year-end total assets and then 
winsorized at 1% and 99% to run the regression. We use the regression error 𝜀𝑖𝑡 as our alternative 
measure of tax aggressiveness, denoted as 𝑇𝐹_𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑡. See Appendix B1 for BTD models as in 
Equations (1) and (2).  
3.2 Sample and models 
We screen the annual reports of all A-share listed firms during the 2006-2012 period for 
tax reconciliation information disclosed in the notes to the financial statements. Financial sector 
firms are excluded due to the different nature of their assets and liabilities. Our efforts result in a 
hand-collected dataset of 958 firm-year observations compiled from tax reconciliations of 217 
Chinese listed firms for our sample period. For financial year 2006, we have used the restated 
accounting values complying with the 2006 Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises 
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(ASBE, 2006) to ensure consistency in the analysis. Our sample size is about twice as big as that 
of Tang and Firth (2011, 2012) and is significantly larger than Wahab and Holland (2015) which 
utilize tax reconciliations of UK listed firms and Richardson et al. (2013) that use directly 
identified tax avoidance activities of Australian firms. Table 2 shows the distribution of our sample 
by year and by CSRC industry classifications. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
We collect the financial data and corporate governance information from China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research database (CSMAR). In light of previous work by Firth et al. 
(2006, 2007), Chen et al. (2011), Conyon and He (2011), and Huang and Boateng (2017), we use 
the sum of cash compensation to the top 3 executives EXEPAY as our main cash compensation 
variable. We’ve also collected the top 3 directors (including executive directors) and denote this 
variable as DIRPAY. Additionally, we’ve collected the sum of cash compensation to all executives, 
directors, and supervisors and the total number of executives, directors, and supervisors and 
calculate our third measure of compensation as the average per person compensation to executives, 
directors, and supervisors, denoted as EDSPAY. We adopt DIRPAY and EDSPAY in addition to 
EXEPAY in our empirical tests as robustness checks. Consistently, Armstrong et al. (2012) have 
examined CEO, CFO, and tax directors’ compensations and tax aggressiveness among US firms. 
The rationale behind this is the consideration of the two-tier board system in China. In particular, 
former government officials and managers with political connections are often appointed as 
executives and directors of Chinese listed firms which increases the chance of director-executive 
coalition (Firth et al., 2006; Ding et al., 2010; Pan and Tian, 2017). These compensation variables 
are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the influence of outliers. We calculate the log values of 
these compensation variables due to their log-normal distributions. In summary, the cash 
compensation measures used in the empirical analysis are LOG(EXEPAY), LOG(DIRPAY), and 
LOG(EDSPAY).  
Alternatively, excess cash compensation is estimated, on the basis of the cash 
compensation measures derived above, as robustness checks. Prior literature has been examining 
executive compensation and performance through the lens of managerial power. Management 
theory defines managerial power as the ability of executives to influence pay decisions made by 
the board of directors which facilitates executives to pursue their self-interest (Chen et al., 2011). 
Typically, this literature adopts a regression based approach to estimate the excess compensation. 
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According to Core et al. (1999), Brick et al. (2006), and Chung et al. (2015), the predicted 
component of managerial compensation arises from the characteristics of board and ownership 
structure in addition to the factors such as firm size and performance. As for Chinese firms, Huang 
and Boateng (2017) document a positive association between executive/director compensation (or 
excess compensation) and firm level information asymmetry. Following this recent work, we adopt 
a model with fixed firm 𝛼𝑖 and fixed year τt effects to estimate the expected cash compensation 
based on the following factors: proxies for managerial structural power in determining their 
compensations - the equity shareholdings of respective executives, directors, and supervisors 
(Shareholding) and board independence (BOARDIND); Tobin’s Q ratio (Tobin’s Q) as a proxy 
for firm growth opportunities; return on equity (ROE) also included as profitability is associated 
with pay reward; and firm size measured by the log of market capitalization LOGMC.  
Log(𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +τt + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
--- Equation (3) 
In Equation (3), 𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖𝑡 refers to the cash compensation variables EXEPAY, DIRPAY, and 
EDSPAY. The excess cash compensation is the prediction error 𝜀𝑖𝑡  from the above model 
calculated as the difference between actual pay (in log form) minus the expected pay from the 
model predictions. These are denoted as EXCESS LOG(EXEPAY), EXCESS LOG(DIRPAY), 
and EXCESS LOG(EDSPAY). 7 See Appendix B2 for the compensation model predictions as in 
Equation (3). 
To test our hypotheses, we follow Tang and Firth (2011, 2012), Wahab and Holland (2015), 
and Richardson et al. (2013) by adopting a Pooled OLS regression model as follows: 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝐹_𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑡 
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝑃𝐴𝑌)𝑖𝑡−1 𝑜𝑟 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑆 𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝑃𝐴𝑌)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + γ𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 + 𝜏𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
--- Equation (4) 
                                                          
7 We use all firm-year observations of non-financial and non-distress firms ( distress firms are denoted as ST/*ST) to 
estimate the predicted cash compensation in Equation (3). The R-squared of the prediction regressions are 46.6%, 
36.1%, and 50.5% for executive cash compensation (EXEPAY), director cash compensation (DIRPAY), and average 
per person leadership cash compensation (EDSPAY), respectively.  
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The dependent variables are our tax aggressiveness measures 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐹_𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑡. 
The main independent variables in the model are the log of (excess) executive and director cash 
compensation LOG(EXEPAY), LOG(DIRPAY), LOG(EDSPAY), or EXCESS LOG(EXEPAY), 
EXCESS LOG(DIRPAY), EXCESS LOG(EDSPAY). We control for fixed industry and year 
effects by including the groups of industry dummies based on CSRC industry classifications 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 
and year dummies 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 .
8 Coefficient α is the intercept and 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is the regression error. We 
calculate robust t-statistics for model coefficients based on standard errors clustered by firm and 
year. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 represent a number of control variables. First, we controls for board composition, 
board effectiveness, and auditor quality as these can influence the managerial resource diversions 
and rent seeking activities through tax avoidance (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006, 2009; Richardson 
et al., 2013; Armstrong et al., 2015). Specifically, the control variables we include in our main 
regressions are the percentage of  independent directors (BOARDIND), the number of directors 
(BOARDSIZE), the number of board meetings in a year (BOARDMEET), the CEO duality 
dummy (CEOD), the “Big-4” auditor dummy (BIG4AUDIT) and auditor opinion dummy 
(AUDITOP). Second, we add controls for firm ownership due to potential effects of the Chinese 
institutional environment documented by Sun and Tong (2003) and Jiang et al. (2010). These are 
state-shares percentage (STASH), government associated firm controlling shareholder dummy 
(GOVCON), and mutual funds shareholding percentage (FUNDSH). 9  Third, we control for 
financial leverage (LEVERAGE) considering the impact of debt-holder monitoring (Kabir et al., 
2013; and Hasan et al., 2014), since leverage is known to facilitate tunnelling (Liu and Tian, 2012; 
Qian and Yeung, 2015), and the potential “substitution effect” or “complementary effect” of debt 
for tax aggressiveness (Lim, 2011, 2012; Lin et al., 2014; and Richardson et al., 2014). Fourth, we 
include control variables for earnings management measured by the discretionary accruals scaled 
by total assets (DACC) (Dechow and Dichev, 2002) due to its positive effect on BTDs documented 
by Tang and Firth (2011). We further include the return on equity (ROE) and a dummy variable 
                                                          
8 In all regressions we have controlled for the fixed industry and fixed year effects, omitted variables, particularly 
these are “fixed for given industry across years” and “fixed for given year across firms” are therefore controlled. 
9 Chinese listed firms issue multiple classes of shares. Shares traded on stock exchanges are A-shares and B-shares.  
Non-tradable shares are classified as state-shares and legal person shares. The state, its agency, and SOEs control the 
majority of the listed firms. 
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for net profit (LOSS). Finally, common control variables are included, i.e., firm size measured as 
the log of market capitalization (LOGMC), and growth opportunity measured as the book-to-price 
ratio (BOOK/PRICE). To mitigate the problems of endogeneity, all independent variables, except 
for the dummy variables, are lagged by 1 year. For robustness checks, to simultaneously account 
for the endogeneity of compensation, tax aggressiveness, ownership and control, leverage, and 
corporate governance, we further include the lagged dependent variable Lag_1.TAXAGG and 
Lag_1.TF_AGG on the right hand side of Equation (4) and use the two-step Arellano and Bover 
(1995)/Blundell and Bond (1998) dynamic panel-data system estimator with Windmeijer (2005) 
bias-corrected robust standard errors for estimation. Appendix C provides more detailed 
descriptions of all variables. Table 3 summarizes our variables. All non-dummy variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effects of outliers.  
 (Insert Table 3 here) 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Baseline regression results 
Regressions in Tables 4 and 5 follow Equation (4) to test H1. The dependent variable is 
TAXAGG in Table 4 estimated from Equation (1), and TF_AGG in Table 5 estimated using Tang 
and Firth (2011, 2012) model from Equation (2). Irrespective of which tax aggressiveness measure 
is used, we can conclude from both tables that (excess) cash compensation is negatively and 
significantly related to tax aggressiveness, thereby supporting H1. Our finding here contributes 
significantly to a body of literature based on primarily US observations where equity incentive 
compensation is widely used for improving the alignment of interests between shareholders and 
managers  (Minnick and Noga, 2010; Armstrong et al., 2012, 2015; and Rego and Wilson, 2012). 
In China, however,  executive compensation is primarily paid in cash, managers tend to focus more 
on short-term objectives, therefore are less inclined to engage in tax aggressiveness which  have 
been found to be beneficial to firm values in the long-run but detrimental in the short-term (Healy, 
1985; Minnick and Noga, 2010; and Duru et al., 2005, 2012). This is because cash compensation 
is often subject to stricter market scrutiny than incentive compensation, i.e. the pressure of adverse 
selection in the equity and debt market. (Hasan et al., 2014; Chung et al., 2015). 
We also notice that, among the control variables, BIG4AUDIT is positively related to tax 
aggressiveness. While this does not indicate audit quality reduces tax aggressiveness, it may 
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suggest that firms that are more tax aggressive use “Big-4” accounting firms as their auditors to 
improve external monitoring and avoid investor adverse selection. Mutual fund shareholding 
(FUNDSH) reduces tax aggressiveness and financial leverage (LEVERAGE) increases tax 
aggressiveness. These results are in line with hypotheses H2 and H3 which will be further explored 
later. Earnings management (DACC) is positively associated with tax aggressiveness as expected 
according to Tang and Firth (2011). Loss-making firms are less aggressive with tax avoidance as 
their need for tax sheltering is genuinely low. We also find that state-shares percentage (STASH) 
and government control (GOVCON) are positively related to tax aggressiveness suggesting weak 
internal governance and strong political connection tend to facilitate tax aggressiveness. These 
results are in line with Kim and Zhang (2016) which show that politically connected firms are 
more tax aggressive due to lower detection risk, better access to inside information regarding future 
changes in tax regulation and enforcement, lower capital market pressure for transparency, lower 
political costs associated with aggressive tax planning, and higher risk-taking tendencies.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
Table 4 results also reveal that firm size measured by LOGMC only weakly affects tax 
aggressiveness in models 1-3 using the log of cash compensation as dependent variables, and does 
not affect tax aggressiveness in models 4-6 using the excess of log compensation as dependent 
variables. This suggests that firm size influences tax aggressiveness through its association with 
executive cash compensation. We conduct an additional test by repeating the regressions in Tables 
4 and 5 after incorporating an interaction term of cash compensation and firm size. The negative 
link between compensation and tax aggressiveness remains robust after controlling for this 
interaction. The interaction itself, although statistically significant, has very small economic 
impact on the dependent variable given the coefficients. The results of these additional tests are 
reported in Appendix B3.10      
 (Insert Table 5 here) 
                                                          
10 We thank our reviewer for an excellent suggestions here. Further tests on subsamples classified by the median size 
value of the sample reveal that the negative compensation-tax aggressiveness relationship still holds among larger 
firms although weaker compared to the effect among smaller firms. Regression results on the subsamples are 




The above findings support the conjecture that firms paying higher compensation are under 
greater external pressure to reduce tax aggressiveness, especially when their internal governance 
mechanisms are ineffective. We now explore two possible channels through which the external 
monitoring agents may influence the relationship between cash compensation and tax 
aggressiveness. These two external monitoring agents are mutual funds and creditors. In Table 6, 
we report regressions with interactions between excess cash compensation and mutual funds 
shareholding added into Equation (4). Two measures are used to capture the extent of mutual funds’ 
influence over firms’ tax aggressiveness. Panel A reports the results where we use a dummy 
variable, high mutual funds (HFUNDSH), which equals to 1 if the percentage shareholding by 
mutual funds (FUNDSH) is above the median and 0 if it is below. Panel B reports the results where 
the percentage of mutual funds shareholdings (FUNDSH) is used. Results reported in both panels 
suggest that the interaction is negative and significant with either measure of mutual funds 
shareholdings, thereby strongly support H2. This result is consistent with Moore (2012) which 
finds a negative association between mutual funds ownership and book-tax differences among US 
firms. We conclude that under the presence of managerial power, measured  by excess cash 
compensation, mutual funds shareholding mitigate the risk of firms’ tax aggressiveness by 
restraining high-power managers’ investment in tax avoidance. This finding indicates that firms 
paying higher excess cash compensations are under the market pressure to reduce tax 
aggressiveness to avoid adverse selection by mutual fund investors.11 It also supports the view that 
mutual funds in China pursue more short-term objectives compared to those in the Western 
developed markets and have started to pay an important governance role after major regulatory 
efforts (Firth et al., 2016).  
(Insert Table 6 here) 
Last but not least, in Table 7 we explore the potential influence of financial leverage on the 
relation between cash compensation and tax aggressiveness. A similar adjustment to Equation (4) 
is made by including interactions between (excess) cash compensation and a high leverage dummy 
(HLEV), which equals to 1 if the market value based financial leverage ratio is above the median 
                                                          
11 Unreported tests suggest that the interactions between cash compensation and mutual funds shareholding are 
insignificant determinants of tax aggressiveness suggesting mutual funds exert stronger monitoring pressure on the 
basis of excess compensation that is not due to firm performance but a reflection of agency costs and managerial 
power.   
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and 0 if it is below. Both results reported in Panel A, regressing with cash compensation, and Panel 
B, regressing with excess cash compensation, show that these interactions are positively and 
significantly associated with tax aggressiveness thus strongly support H3. Nonetheless, the 
coefficients on (excess) cash compensation variables remain negative and significant. In each of 
these models, the sum of the coefficients on the interaction and (excess) cash compensation is 
close to zero suggesting that high leverage offsets the negative link between cash compensation 
and tax aggressiveness. HLEV is positively and significantly related to tax aggressiveness in all 
regressions. Our findings here support the conjectured complementary relationship between the 
use of debt and tax aggressiveness to shelter tax burdens (Duru et al., 2005, 2012). In addition, 
they are in line with the argument made by Liu and Tian (2012) and Qian and Yeung (2015) that 
high leverage facilitates tunneling behavior of the controlling shareholders, which has been found 
as a particularly prominent phenomenon in China. In developed financial markets, creditors are 
expected to restrict firms’ tax aggressiveness (Lim, 2011; 2012; Kabir et al., 2013; Hasan et al., 
2014; Lin et al., 2014; Richardson et al., 2014). Under the unique institutional setting of the 
Chinese market, however, it appears that easy access to debt or high level of debt facilitates tax 
aggressiveness by providing more flexibility and resources at the managerial discretion to engage 
in risky tax avoidance activities.12 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
4.2 Dynamic panel data models using system GMM estimator 
We conduct a further robustness test in this section to simultaneously account for the 
endogeneity of compensation, tax aggressiveness, ownership and control, leverage, and corporate 
governance. We use the two-step Arellano and Bover (1995)/Blundell and Bond (1998) dynamic 
panel-data system estimator with Windmeijer (2005) bias-corrected robust standard errors in the  
models. Results are reported in Table 8. In particular, we add a lagged dependent variable 
Lag_1.TAXAGG and Lag_1.TF_AGG to the right hand side of Equation (4). All other 
independent variables in our model are considered endogenous and industry/year effects are 
                                                          
12 Unreported tests on subsamples classified by the median leverage ratio and the median mutual fund shareholdings 
ratio show that the negative compensation-tax aggressiveness relationship still holds among high leverage firms, but 
not among low mutual fund shareholding firms. These results are again largely consistent with the results on the full 
sample, as reported in tables 6&7. 
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dropped due to the dynamic nature of the model. In these GMM models, past period information 
has been controlled for using the lagged dependent variable, and the coefficients on the remaining 
determinants indicate the marginal influence of “new” contemporaneous information. For model 
estimation, we take the first-difference of all the variables, estimate the model by generalized 
method of moments (GMM) and use lagged values of executive cash compensation and other firm 
characteristics as instruments.  
(Insert Table 8 here) 
Results in Table 8 appear to be consistent with those reported in Tables 4-7 and are in line 
with our hypotheses H1, H2, and H3. Executive cash compensation is negatively and significantly 
associated with tax aggressiveness in all 6 models. The interaction between compensation and the 
percentage of mutual fund shareholding LOG(EXEPAY)*FUNDSH is negatively and 
significantly related to tax aggressiveness in models 2 and 5. The interaction between 
compensation and the percentage of financial leverage LOG(EXEPAY)*LEVERAGE is 
positively and significantly related to tax aggressiveness in models 3 and 6. We also test for second 
order serial correlations AR(2) and run the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, and results 
support the validity of our model and the GMM instruments. Moreover, in models 2/3/5/6, we 
have also included interactions between executive cash compensation and dummy variables 
HFUND and HLEV in addition to the interaction between compensation and the percentages of 
fund shareholding FUNDSH and leverage LEVERAGE. We find that the interaction between 
compensation, the percentages of fund shareholding and leverage dominate the interactions with 
dummies in a “horse race”. This model specification shows a weak threshold impact of fund 
shareholding using the HFUND dummy in addition to the percentage variable FUNDSH. Similar 
threshold impact of the HLEV dummy appears to be statistically insignificant. Taken together, 
these results indicate that while H2 and H3 are supported (with regard to the direction of impact 
given the coefficients on the percentage variables), tax aggressiveness is less sensitive to changes 
of mutual fund shareholding (and leverage to less extent) for firms with above-median percentage 
of mutual fund shareholding (and above-median level of leverage).13 
                                                          
13 For example in model 2, the influence of executive cash compensation on tax aggressiveness is LOG(EXEPAY)*(-
0.362-1.559*FUNDSH+0.438*HFUND). When HFUND equals to 1, the sensitivity of tax aggressiveness to 





Tax plays an important role in both public policies and corporate decisions. Much has been 
learned over the past decade on the determinants of firm tax avoidance activities and the economic 
consequences of tax avoidance under the agency theory framework (Chen and Chu, 2005; Crocker 
and Slemrod, 2005; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006, 2009; Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009; Minnick and 
Noga, 2010; Kim et al., 2011; Rego and Wilson, 2012; Armstrong et al., 2015). The extant 
literature suggests that managerial equity-based incentive compensation encourages managers to 
invest in aggressive tax avoidance activities (Minnick and Noga, 2010; Armstrong et al., 2012, 
2015; Rego and Wilson, 2012). In contrast, the association between cash-based compensation, 
including mainly salaries and bonuses, and tax aggresiveness is understudied. To fill this research 
gap, this paper utilizes the Chinese setting where executives and directors of the listed companies 
are paid primarily in cash with very limited use of equity incentives (Firth et al., 2006, 2007; Chen 
et al., 2011; Conyon and He, 2011). We find that firms paying higher executive cash compensation, 
or higher excess cash compensation, are associated with lower tax aggressiveness. Mutual funds 
ownership strengthens the negative link between excess cash compensation and tax aggressiveness 
indicating the monitoring role of mutual funds pressures firms that pay high compensation to 
reduce tax aggressiveness to avoid investor adverse selection and share price discounts. Consistent 
with the prior evidence that high leverage facilitates the tunnelling behaviour of the controlling 
shareholders in China, we document that high leverage offsets the negative link between cash 
compensation and tax aggressiveness suggesting that financial leverage and tax aggressiveness are 
complementary to each other under the weak creditor protection environment in China. Our 
findings shed light on the influence of broader corporate governance environment in China’s 
transition economy on tax aggressiveness and significantly extend the prior studies conducted 
mainly on the US firms featured with rather different agency conflicts (Sun and Tong, 2003; Jiang 
et al., 2010). Corporate executive compensation designs in many emerging markets around the 
world share similar features as Chinese firms due to their similar ownership structure and agency 
relationships (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Lins, 2003). 
Our research therefore has potential common implications for many regions outside of the US and 
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Table 1: Hypothesized drivers of BTDs 
  Category of BTD Hypothesized Drivers of Category Proxy variables  






2 Expenses not deductible Industry membership; operating 
expenses. 
Fixed-effects 𝛼𝑖 
(Fixed firm effects) 
OPEXPit  
(Operating expenses) 
3 The effect of the application of a 
different tax rate to income, either 
because it is generated abroad or 
because it is subject to a different 
domestic tax rate 
Profit before exceptional items; total 
assets; geographical location. 
FSALEit  
(The percentage of sales from 
overseas) 
LOG(ASSETSit ) 
(The log of total assets) 
OPBITit  
(Operating profit before interest 
and tax) 
𝜏𝑡  
(Fixed year effects) 
4 Prior year adjustments Prior two years’ lagged pre-tax 
profit. 
PBTit-1  
(1-year lagged pre-tax profit) 
PBTit -2  
(2-year lagged pre-tax profit) 
5 Utilization of brought-forward tax 
losses (Recognition of previous 
unrecognized losses) 
Current period pre-tax profit and 





6 Current period tax losses carried 
forward (Current period 
unrecognized losses) 
Current period pre-tax profit and 




7 Taxation of capital gains and 
losses 
Accounting gains on sale of fixed 
assets 
N/A 
8 Other permanent differences Unobservable fixed firm and year 
effects 
Fixed-effects 𝛼𝑖 
(Fixed firm effects) 
𝜏𝑡  



















Transportation and warehousing 120 
Information technology 50 
Wholesale and retail trade 30 
Real estate 96 
Social service 39 







Table 3: Summary of variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TAXAGG 958 0.01 0.80 -2.70 2.08 
TF_AGG 958 0.01 0.75 -2.65 2.02 
EXEPAY 952 2186639 1875059 237788 11500000 
DIRPAY 952 2188442 1873954 244110 11500000 
EDSPAY 953 6430822 6411402 460772 39700000 
LOG(EXEPAY) 952 6.34 6.27 5.38 7.06 
LOG(DIRPAY) 952 6.34 6.27 5.39 7.06 
LOG(EDSPAY) 953 6.81 6.81 5.66 7.60 
EXCESS LOG(EXEPAY) 942 0.04 0.28 -0.66 0.70 
EXCESS LOG(DIRPAY) 909 0.03 0.33 -0.89 0.80 
EXCESS LOG(EDSPAY) 943 0.03 0.27 -0.67 0.66 
BOARDIND 950 0.37 0.06 0.27 0.60 
BOARDSIZE 950 9.98 2.22 6.00 15.00 
BOARDMEET 957 10.07 4.66 4.00 29.46 
CEOD 943 0.93 0.26 0.00 1.00 
BIG4AUDIT 958 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 
AUDITOP 958 0.97 0.17 0.00 1.00 
LEVERAGE 958 0.35 0.21 0.03 0.81 
DACC 934 0.10 6.61 -19.22 20.65 
ROE 949 0.09 0.11 -0.46 0.37 
LOGMC 953 10.02 0.58 8.83 11.79 
BOOK/PRICE 957 0.79 0.28 0.18 1.38 
LOSS 958 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
STASH 958 0.19 0.24 0.00 0.77 
GOVCON 917 0.85 0.36 0.00 1.00 
FUNDSH 933 0.12 0.15 0.00 0.58 




Table 4: Executive and director cash compensations and firm tax aggressiveness (TAXAGG) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LOG(EXEPAY) -0.294***      
 (-3.39)      
LOG(DIRPAY)  -0.264***     
  (-3.24)     
LOG(EDSPAY)   -0.292***    
   (-3.21)    
EXCESS LOG(EXEPAY)    -0.223**   
    (-2.17)   
EXCESS LOG(DIRPAY)     -0.230**  
     (-2.57)  
EXCESS LOG(EDSPAY)      -0.268*** 
      (-2.70) 
BOARDIND -0.586 -0.702 -0.592 -0.566 -0.523 -0.575 
 (-1.20) (-1.40) (-1.21) (-1.27) (-1.15) (-1.29) 
BOARDSIZE 0.023* 0.021 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.015 
 (1.73) (1.50) (1.43) (1.43) (1.25) (1.26) 
BOARDMEET 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (1.09) (0.81) (0.94) (0.91) (0.74) (0.86) 
CEOD -0.019 -0.027 -0.027 -0.009 -0.022 -0.017 
 (-0.16) (-0.22) (-0.22) (-0.08) (-0.17) (-0.14) 
BIG4AUDIT 0.211*** 0.203*** 0.217*** 0.207*** 0.200*** 0.210*** 
 (3.49) (3.23) (3.58) (3.43) (3.19) (3.50) 
AUDITOP -0.137 -0.155 -0.155 -0.207 -0.210 -0.203 
 (-0.66) (-0.73) (-0.74) (-1.05) (-1.05) (-1.03) 
STASH 0.275* 0.254* 0.283* 0.291** 0.267* 0.291** 
 (1.84) (1.67) (1.91) (1.98) (1.79) (1.99) 
GOVCON 0.138* 0.121 0.137* 0.180** 0.164* 0.175** 
 (1.69) (1.41) (1.67) (2.18) (1.89) (2.12) 
FUNDSH -0.449** -0.445** -0.428* -0.559*** -0.551** -0.550*** 
 (-2.05) (-1.98) (-1.95) (-2.68) (-2.57) (-2.64) 
LOGMC 0.111* 0.102* 0.090* -0.061 -0.057 -0.057 
 (1.95) (1.83) (1.68) (-1.56) (-1.43) (-1.48) 
LEVERAGE 0.950*** 0.966*** 0.993*** 1.048*** 1.058*** 1.075*** 
 (4.99) (4.95) (5.25) (5.79) (5.72) (5.96) 
BOOK/PRICE 0.195 0.250 0.186 0.202 0.228 0.187 
 (1.11) (1.33) (1.06) (1.27) (1.36) (1.18) 
DACC 0.842* 0.828* 0.860* 0.704 0.694 0.708 
 (1.85) (1.76) (1.89) (1.55) (1.49) (1.57) 
ROE -0.986* -0.955 -0.967* 0.144* 0.145* 0.146* 
 (-1.72) (-1.63) (-1.68) (1.73) (1.77) (1.76) 
LOSS -0.510*** -0.479*** -0.504*** -0.191 -0.166 -0.193 
  (-2.99) (-2.68) (-2.97) (-1.40) (-1.17) (-1.43) 
Observations 865 833 866 865 833 866 
R-squared 0.263 0.260 0.262 0.253 0.252 0.255 
Notes: All models are OLS regressions controlling for industry and year fixed-effects. The dependent variable in all regressions 
is tax aggressiveness TAXAGG. The numbers in parentheses are robust t-statistics for regression coefficients with firm-level 
clustered standard errors. To reduce the endogeneity problem, all the continuous independent variables are lagged by 1 year. See 




Table 5: Executive and director cash compensations and firm tax aggressiveness (TF_AGG) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LOG(EXEPAY) -0.247***      
 (-2.90)      
LOG(DIRPAY)  -0.235***     
  (-2.86)     
LOG(EDSPAY)   -0.256***    
   (-2.85)    
EXCESS LOG(EXEPAY)    -0.209**   
    (-2.02)   
EXCESS LOG(DIRPAY)     -0.229**  
     (-2.50)  
EXCESS LOG(EDSPAY)      -0.262*** 
      (-2.62) 
Observations 867 835 868 867 835 868 
R-squared 0.232 0.232 0.232 0.214 0.216 0.217 
Notes: All models are OLS regressions controlling for industry and year fixed-effects. The dependent variable in all 
regressions is tax aggressiveness TF_AGG. The numbers in parentheses are robust t-statistics for regression coefficients with 
firm-level clustered standard errors. To reduce the endogeneity problem, all the continuous independent variables are lagged 








Table 6: Mutual funds, excess executive and director compensation, and tax aggressiveness 
Panel A: The influence of high mutual funds shareholding (HFUNDSH) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var. TAXAGG TAXAGG TAXAGG TF_AGG TF_AGG TF_AGG 
EXCESS LOG(EXEPAY)*HFUNDSH -0.333*   -0.474**   
 (-1.75)   (-2.53)   
EXCESS LOG(DIRPAY)*HFUNDSH  -0.373**   -0.458***  
  (-2.23)   (-2.70)  
EXCESS LOG(EDSPAY)*HFUNDSH   -0.322*   -0.430** 
   (-1.74)   (-2.35) 
EXCESS LOG(EXEPAY) -0.061   0.032   
 (-0.40)   (0.22)   
EXCESS LOG(DIRPAY)  -0.040   0.007  
  (-0.29)   (0.05)  
EXCESS LOG(EDSPAY)   -0.081   -0.017 
   (-0.53)   (-0.11) 
HFUNDSH -0.047 -0.053 -0.053 -0.082 -0.088 -0.088 
 (-0.83) (-0.91) (-0.95) (-1.49) (-1.57) (-1.64) 
Observations 865 833 866 867 835 868 
R-squared 0.218 0.219 0.219 0.185 0.189 0.186 
Panel B: The influence of mutual funds % shareholding (FUNDSH) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var. TAXAGG TAXAGG TAXAGG TF_AGG TF_AGG TF_AGG 
EXCESS LOG(EXEPAY)*FUNDSH -1.746**   -2.170***   
 (-2.53)   (-3.06)   
EXCESS LOG(DIRPAY)*FUNDSH  -1.472**   -1.647**  
  (-2.37)   (-2.52)  
EXCESS LOG(EDSPAY)*FUNDSH   -1.335*   -1.703** 
   (-1.89)   (-2.35) 
EXCESS LOG(EXEPAY) -0.003   0.064   
 (-0.03)   (0.50)   
EXCESS LOG(DIRPAY)  -0.039   -0.017  
  (-0.33)   (-0.15)  
EXCESS LOG(EDSPAY)   -0.073   -0.023 
   (-0.55)   (-0.18) 
FUNDSH -0.461** -0.476** -0.490** -0.540** -0.559** -0.572** 
 (-2.08) (-2.13) (-2.21) (-2.42) (-2.49) (-2.57) 
Observations 865 833 866 867 835 868 
R-squared 0.230 0.229 0.227 0.201 0.200 0.198 
Notes: All models are OLS regressions controlling for industry and year fixed-effects. The dependent variable for Panels A and B 
regressions is tax aggressiveness TAXAGG, and for Panels C and D regressions is TF_AGG. The numbers in parentheses are 
robust t-statistics for regression coefficients with firm-level clustered standard errors. To reduce the endogeneity problem, all the 
continuous independent variables are lagged by 1 year. FUNDSH is the percentage of shares held by mutual funds. HFUNDSH is 
a dummy which equals to 1 if the percentage of fund shareholding (FUNDSH) is above its median value, or 0 if otherwise. Other 
control variables follow models in Tables 4 and 5. See Appendix C for variable definitions. Other control variables follow models 





Table 7: The influence of leverage on the compensation and tax aggressiveness relationship 
Panel A: Executive and director compensation 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var. TAXAGG TAXAGG TAXAGG TF_AGG TF_AGG TF_AGG 
LOG(EXEPAY)*HLEV 0.534***   0.506***   
 (4.57)   (4.29)   
LOG(DIRPAY)*HLEV  0.478***   0.480***  
  (4.75)   (4.80)  
LOG(EDSPAY)*HLEV   0.564***   0.548*** 
   (4.95)   (4.82) 
LOG(EXEPAY) -0.449***   -0.392***   
 (-4.97)   (-4.51)   
LOG(DIRPAY)  -0.437***   -0.408***  
  (-4.84)   (-4.54)  
LOG(EDSPAY)   -0.482***   -0.441*** 
   (-4.96)   (-4.69) 
HLEV 0.025*** 0.608*** 0.699*** 0.867*** 0.634*** 0.629*** 
 (4.13) (4.23) (4.39) (3.87) (4.30) (4.28) 
Observations 865 833 866 867 835 868 
R-squared 0.273 0.270 0.272 0.246 0.248 0.247 
Panel B: Excess executive and director compensation 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var. TAXAGG TAXAGG TAXAGG TF_AGG TF_AGG TF_AGG 
EXCESS LOG(EXEPAY)*HLEV 0.377**   0.292   
 (1.98)   (1.52)   
EXCESS LOG(DIRPAY)*HLEV  0.393**   0.374**  
  (2.38)   (2.24)  
EXCESS LOG(EDSPAY)*HLEV   0.373**   0.353** 
   (2.07)   (1.99) 
EXCESS LOG(EXEPAY) -0.384***   -0.343**   
 (-2.75)   (-2.40)   
EXCESS LOG(DIRPAY)  -0.414***   -0.412***  
  (-3.12)   (-2.98)  
EXCESS LOG(EDSPAY)   -0.425***   -0.428*** 
   (-3.19)   (-3.04) 
HLEV 0.294*** 0.303*** 0.305*** 0.302*** 0.319*** 0.310*** 
 (5.34) (5.33) (5.61) (4.55) (4.69) (4.70) 
Observations 865 833 866 867 835 868 
R-squared 0.247 0.248 0.249 0.214 0.219 0.218 
Notes: All models are OLS regressions controlling for industry and year fixed-effects. The dependent variable for Panels A and B 
regressions is tax aggressiveness TAXAGG, and for Panels C and D regressions is TF_AGG. The numbers in parentheses are 
robust t-statistics for regression coefficients with firm-level clustered standard errors. To reduce the endogeneity problem, all the 
continuous independent variables are lagged by 1 year. HLEV is a dummy which equals to 1 if the leverage ratio (LEVERAGE) is 
above its median value, or 0 if otherwise. Other control variables follow models in Tables 4 and 5. Other control variables follow 




Table 8: Dynamic panel data models using system GMM estimator 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var. TAXAGG TAXAGG TAXAGG TF_AGG TF_AGG TF_AGG 
Lag_1.TAXAGG 0.249*** 0.246*** 0.234***    
 (6.72) (6.93) (6.54)    
Lag_1.TF_AGG    0.195*** 0.201*** 0.173*** 
    (5.98) (6.35) (5.49) 
LOG(EXEPAY) -0.282** -0.362** -0.870*** -0.342** -0.400** -1.075*** 
 (-2.16) (-2.23) (-3.80) (-2.54) (-2.38) (-4.58) 
LOG(EXEPAY)*HFUND  0.438**   0.433*  
  (2.00)   (1.90)  
LOG(EXEPAY)*FUNDSH  -1.559**   -1.607**  
  (-1.97)   (-1.99)  
LOG(EXEPAY)*HLEV   -0.457   -0.561* 
   (-1.57)   (-1.88) 
LOG(EXEPAY)*LEVERAGE   1.996***   2.581*** 
   (2.93)   (3.68) 
HFUND  -2.752**   -2.737*  
  (-1.99)   (-1.90)  
FUNDSH -0.327 9.548* -0.403 -0.452 9.741 -0.556** 
 (-1.18) (1.65) (-1.55) (-1.58) (1.63) (-2.08) 
HLEV   3.060*   3.769** 
   (1.66)   (1.99) 
LEVERAGE 0.981*** 0.996*** -11.951*** 0.904*** 0.958*** -15.803*** 
 (3.76) (4.08) (-2.75) (3.40) (3.82) (-3.54) 
BOARDIND 1.829** 1.829*** 1.631** 1.735** 1.748** 1.608** 
 (2.41) (2.61) (2.37) (2.25) (2.44) (2.30) 
BOARDSIZE 0.037 0.049** 0.026 0.031 0.041* 0.018 
 (1.61) (2.33) (1.21) (1.28) (1.91) (0.82) 
BOARDMEET 0.002 -0.003 0.005 0.003 -0.004 0.006 
 (0.19) (-0.46) (0.73) (0.33) (-0.51) (0.81) 
CEOD 0.099 0.008 0.081 0.059 -0.015 0.052 
 (0.68) (0.06) (0.62) (0.39) (-0.10) (0.38) 
BIG4AUDIT 0.066 0.069 0.089 0.028 0.040 0.074 
 (0.59) (0.66) (0.83) (0.25) (0.38) (0.69) 
AUDITOP -0.554** -0.535** -0.376* -0.519** -0.500** -0.330 
 (-2.54) (-2.52) (-1.81) (-2.31) (-2.28) (-1.55) 
STASH 0.346** 0.318** 0.343** 0.342** 0.345** 0.368*** 
 (2.35) (2.27) (2.48) (2.28) (2.40) (2.59) 
GOVCON -0.051 -0.040 -0.128 -0.105 -0.130 -0.174 
 (-0.30) (-0.26) (-0.81) (-0.61) (-0.82) (-1.08) 
LOGMC 0.196** 0.199** 0.251*** 0.234*** 0.225** 0.291*** 
 (2.23) (2.32) (2.98) (2.59) (2.56) (3.36) 
BOOK/PRICE -0.309* -0.292* -0.341** -0.229 -0.251 -0.290* 
 (-1.75) (-1.77) (-2.04) (-1.27) (-1.47) (-1.69) 
DACC -0.138 -0.210 -0.144 0.032 0.041 0.013 
 (-0.29) (-0.49) (-0.33) (0.07) (0.09) (0.03) 
ROE -0.364 -0.420 -0.535 -0.600 -0.703 -0.811* 
 (-0.80) (-1.00) (-1.26) (-1.26) (-1.59) (-1.83) 
LOSS -0.417*** -0.425*** -0.358*** -0.297** -0.322** -0.246* 
35 
 
 (-3.04) (-3.29) (-2.73) (-2.07) (-2.38) (-1.81) 
Constant -0.863 -0.419 2.391* -0.708 -0.237 3.416** 
 (-0.89) (-0.37) (1.67) (-0.71) (-0.20) (2.34) 
Observations 660 660 660 661 661 661 
Number of firms 190 190 190 191 191 191 
AR(2) 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.22 0.23 0.22 
Sargan 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.11 
Notes: We use the two-step Arellano and Bover (1995)/Blundell and Bond (1998) dynamic panel-data system 
estimator with Windmeijer (2005) bias-corrected robust standard errors in models 1-6. All independent variables are 
considered as endogenous variables. We control for the first lag of the dependent variables Lag_1.TAXAGG and 
Lag_1.TF_AGG in these models to mitigate second order serial correlations. We conduct second order serial 
correlations AR(2) test and Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. All regressions include a constant. See 






Appendix A: 000022: Shenzhen CHIWAN WHARF HOLDINGS LIMITED 2012 annual reports 
 
Income tax expenses (in RMB):  
 
Item 2012 2011 
Current tax expenses 133,843,163 155,728,890 
Deferred tax expenses (8,718,115) (7,167,257) 
Total  125,125,048 148,561,633 
 
Reconciliation of income tax expenses to the accounting profit is as follows (in RMB):  
 
Item 2012 2011 
Accounting profit 740,894,558 816,337,301 
Income tax expenses calculated at 25% (the prior 
year: 24 %) 
185,223,640 195,920,952 
Effect of expenses that are not deductible for tax 
purposes 
3,715,114 2,746,526 
Effect of tax-free income (20,879,728) (28,374,764) 
Effect of unrecognized deductible losses and 
deductible temporary differences for tax purposes 
957,342 1,003,459 
Changes in opening balances of deferred tax 
assets/liabilities due to the adjustment in tax rate 
 2,290,517 
Effect of different tax rates of subsidiaries 
operating in other jurisdictions 
(302,040) (244,303) 
Effect of tax preference policy (50,664,660) (30,256,021) 
Withholding tax 7,075,380 5,475,267 
Income tax expense 125,125,048 148,561,633 
 
Note: The tax-effect BTDs can be calculated in two ways. Firstly, employing prima racie income tax expenses minus 
current tax expenses, in this case, it is calculated as follows: for the 2012, 185,223,640-133,843,163+8,718,115-
=60098592. Secondly, it is the sum of the temporary and permanent differences, in this case, it is the sum of the row 






Appendix B1: The Book-Tax Difference (BTD) models 
Our Model – Equation (1)  Tang and Firth (2011) and Tang (2015) Model - Equation (2) 
Dependent Variables BTDit  Dependent Variables BTDit 
OPEXPit 0.000  ΔINVit 0.002 
 (0.32)   (1.16) 
OPBITit -0.091***  ΔREVit 0.000 
 (-4.90)   (0.75) 
PBTit 0.171***  NOLit 1.011*** 
 (8.71)   (14.07) 
PBTit-1 -0.017***  TLUit 0.854*** 
 (-3.10)   (8.18) 
PBTit-2 -0.020***  TAX_DIFFit 0.004*** 
 (2.75)   (2.95) 
INVINCit 0.064***    
 (3.38)    
LOG(ASSETS)it 0.000***    
 (4.08)    
INTINCit -0.165    
 (-1.64)    
FSALEit 0.000    
 (1.38)    
Intercept 0.002*    
 (1.74)    
Year dummies controlled  Year dummies controlled 
Industry dummies controlled  Industry dummies controlled 
Observations 958  Observations 962 
R-square 0.449  R-square 0.401 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is total BTD calculated using manually collected BTD categories. These BTD models 
(1) and (2) control for the drivers of mechanical differences in BTDs. In Equation (1), the independent variables on 
the right hand are the proxies for BTD drivers listed in Table 1 including current period investment income  INVINCit, 
interest income INTINCit, operating expenses OPEXPit, the percentage of overseas sales 𝐹𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑡 , the log of total 
assets LOG(ASSETS)it, operating profit before interest and tax OPBITit, net profit before tax PBTit, and the net profit 
before tax in previous periods PBTit−1 and PBTit−2. In Equation (2), the independent variables are change in fixed 
assets investment ∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡, change in revenue ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡, the value of operating losses 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 , the value of tax loss utilized 
𝑇𝐿𝑈𝑖𝑡 , the difference between the consolidated company's applicable tax rate and the average tax rate in the 





Appendix B2: The executive compensation model predictions 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Dep. Var. LOG(EXEPAY) LOG(DIRPAY) LOG(EDSPAY) 
        
EXE.Shareholding 0.270**   
 (2.41)   
DIR.Shareholding  0.629***  
  (3.60)  
EDS.Shareholding   0.536*** 
   (3.49) 
LOG(Tobin’Q) -0.221*** -0.281*** -0.336*** 
 (-8.24) (-7.74) (-11.99) 
ROE 0.445*** 0.498*** 0.368*** 
 (7.30) (6.74) (6.38) 
LOGMC 0.286*** 0.337*** 0.362*** 
 (12.98) (11.53) (15.87) 
BOARDIND 0.228 -0.559*** -0.123 
 (1.46) (-2.71) (-0.77) 
Constant 11.062*** 10.819*** 11.567*** 
 (66.81) (50.22) (66.48) 
    
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,420 11,403 11,585 
R-squared 0.466 0.361 0.505 
# Firms 2,392 2,386 2,393 
Notes: We use all A-share listed non-financial sector firms during the years 2006-2012 to estimate the predicted cash 
compensation in Equation (3) of section 3.2. All 3 regressions control for fixed firm and fixed year effects. t-statistics 




Appendix B3: The influence of firm size on the compensation and tax aggressiveness relationship 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var. TAXAGG TF_AGG TAXAGG TF_AGG TAXAGG TF_AGG 
LOG(EXEPAY) -0.594*** -0.527***     
 (-6.17) (-5.02)     
LOG(DIRPAY)   -0.632*** -0.575***   
   (-6.31) (-5.20)   
LOG(EDSPAY)     -0.710*** -0.637*** 
     (-6.38) (-5.23) 
LOG(EXEPAY)*LOGMC 0.051*** 0.044***     
 (4.65) (3.88)     
LOG(DIRPAY)*LOGMC   0.052*** 0.045***   
   (4.94) (4.09)   
LOG(EDSPAY)*LOGMC     0.059*** 0.051*** 
     (5.15) (4.26) 
LOGMC -0.050 -0.040 -0.035 -0.014 -0.042 -0.030 
  (-0.72) (-0.54) (-0.56) (-0.21) (-0.70) (-0.47) 
Other firm level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 865 867 833 835 866 868 
R-squared 0.281 0.227 0.280 0.228 0.282 0.228 
Notes: All models are OLS regressions controlling for industry and year fixed-effects. The numbers in parentheses are robust 
t-statistics for regression coefficients with firm-level clustered standard errors. To reduce the endogeneity problem, all the 
continuous independent variables are lagged by 1 year. Other control variables follow models in Tables 4 and 5. Other control 




Appendix C: Variable Definitions 
 
TAXAGG is the measure of the tax aggressiveness, which is the prediction error from our BTD model.  
TF_AGG is the measure of tax aggressiveness for Chinese firms following the BTD model specification in 
Tang and Firth (2011, 2012). 
EXEPAY is the top three executives’ cash compensation, which is the total pay of the top three officers, 
defined as the sum of basic salary and bonus excluding allowance. 
DIRPAY is the top three directors’ cash compensation including basic salary and bonus excluding allowance. 
EDSPAY is the average per person cash compensation paid to board of directors, supervisors, and executives. 
LOG(EXEPAY) is the log of the top three executives' cash compensation. 
LOG(DIRPAY) is the log of the top three directors’ cash compensation. 
LOG(EDSPAY) is the log of the average per person cash compensation to directors, supervisors, and 
executives. 
EXCESS LOG(EXEPAY) is the excess cash compensation for top 3 executives calculated as the prediction 
error of an executive compensation model. 
EXCESS LOG(DIRPAY) is the excessive cash compensation for top 3 directors calculated as the prediction 
error of an director compensation model. 
EXCESS LOG(EDSPAY) is the average per person excessive cash compensation for directors, supervisors, 
and executives calculated as the prediction error of their corresponding per person compensation model. 
BOARDIND is the percentage of board members that are independent. 
BOARDSIZE is the size of the board as the number of directors. 
BOARDMEET is the total number of board meetings in a year. 
CEOD is a dummy which equals to 1 if the chair of the board and the CEO are the same person and 0 if 
they are two persons. 
BIG4AUDIT is a dummy which equals to 1 if the firm’s auditor is one of the “Big-4” accounting firms. 
AUDITOP is a dummy which equals to 1 if the auditor opinion is standard or 0 if it is non-standard.  
LEVERAGE is the market value financial leverage ratio which equals to the book value of debt divided by 
the total of market capitalization and book value of debt. 
HLEV is a dummy which equals to 1 if the leverage ratio is above its median value, or 0 if otherwise. 
DACC is the value of discretionary accruals measured as the prediction error when regressing total accruals 
against change in sales, fixed assets, and industry and year fixed effects. 
ROE is the return on equity. 
LOGMC is the log of firm market capitalization. 
BOOK/PRICE the book-to-price ratio. 
LOSS is a dummy which is equal to 1 if the firm’s net income before extraordinary items is negative, or 0 
if otherwise. 
STASH is the total percentage of shares that are classified as state-shares and state-legal person shares. 
GOVCON is a dummy which equals to 1 if the firm controlling shareholder is government or government 
agency and 0 if it is a private investor. 
FUNDSH is the percentage of shares held by mutual funds. 
HFUNDSH is a dummy which equals to 1 if the percentage of fund shareholding (FUNDSH) is above its 
median value, or 0 if otherwise. 
 
 
